Reagan and Gorbachev at Reykjavik, 1986 Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1000 words

Reagan and Gorbachev at Reykjavik, 1986 - demonstrate ExampleHearing someone say something, even through an interpreter, hearing their tone, seeing their body language, is a good deal better than any e-mail, phone call or letter. Friendships can be developed and communication levels would digest been at their optimum. However, no definite agreement in writing was reached at this meeting. Was it therefore merely a non-event? The Reykjavik summit is chiefly remembered for what almost occurred there, what might have happened. Is it manage open for something that didnt happen to be portentous historically? If it is to be classed as a non-event does that mean that it is significantly different from an event that positively took mystify i.e. the signing of an actual bi-lateral agreement. Is the historical meaning of a non-event inevitably different in character from the significance of an event that did actually occur? This essay will consider this question. Firstly the American adm inistration considered Reyjavik to be only a preliminary meeting, taking their cue from Gorbachevs letter perhaps1, a response to an preceding one from President Reagan. In it the Russian asks only for a very brief meeting where inversely agreeable solutions could be discussed based upon a political will on both sides to succeed in bringing the arms race between the two powers to a peaceful conclusion. It wasnt expected to be that important. However it is clear from transcripts of their conversations that other topics such as human rights were on the table and perhaps these tot to the significance? The list of topics to be c overed provided by the American Secretary of rural area 2certainly saw a decision to have arms talks as being a possible outcome, rather than actual talks. So this was part of a process which would eventually lead to disarmament. This means that this was not a non-event , still the beginnings without which the rest of the process could not have continued. I t laid foundations upon which both sides could built . Gorbachev was very open. As instrument 93 makes clear he was willing to discuss whatever topics Reagan introduced, not just nuclear weapons and possible future disarmament. Also despite the final failure to come to a definite agreement Gorbachev was able to return home and say You see, Reagan is a man we can work with. 4 Despite this it seems from account 6 5that the Soviet reasons for calling the meeting had been completely misunderstood in Washington. They furnish a number of possible reasons, but seem to have no way of knowing which is correct. Also, correspond to Document 7,6 they seem unsure as to how President Reagan should react. The two leaders were able to meet gift to face for several days. Their meeting had been originally planned to be a preliminary discussion, as shown by Gorbachevs letter to the American President in October 1986, but in the end, verbally at least, they hold bilaterally to greatly reduce thei r arms, including both nuclear and ballistic weapons. The agreement later floundered however over details. According to Sokov7 the preparations had been poor and negotiations were disorganised . So politically was this a non-event? George Shultz, the then American Secretary of State had brought the two men together. He is quoted by Sokov as having said - I suppose that what startled hoi polloi in Reykjavik was not what was said, because both Reagan and Gorbachev had